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THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST REVISITED
DONALD H. REGAN
University of Michigan Law School
SOME years ago, in a paper entitled "The Problem of Social Cost,"' Pro-
fessor Ronald Coase asserted and argued for a proposition which has since
acquired the convenient sobriquet "the Coase Theorem." The proposition is:
That in a world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero trans-
action costs, the allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient and
will be unaffected by legal rules regarding the initial impact of costs result-
ing from externalities. Note that there are two claims being made, which it
is well to separate for purposes of discussion. The first claim is that, under
the conditions described, some efficient allocation of resources will be achieved,
whatever the legal rule. The second claim is that, under those conditions, the
same efficient allocation will be achieved, whatever the legal rule. I shall refer
to the first claim as the "efficiency" thesis and to the second claim as the
"invariance" thesis of the Coase Theorem. I shall argue that neither thesis
can be deduced from the traditional assumptions about individual economic
behavior which are the foundation of neoclassical price theory and con-
temporary welfare economics.
2
Let me be quite clear (or as clear as I can be in advance of presenting my
argument)-my primary point is not that the Coase Theorem is false, but
that the truth of the Coase Theorem can only be deduced from an assump-
tion or assumptions which differ in kind from the usual assumptions we
make about economic agents. The most traditional sort of assumption, and
the assumption which is part of every rigorous proof I am familiar with
concerning the existence or efficiency of competitive equilibria, is the assump-
tion that each economic agent maximizes something (utility or profit) in the
face of prices he takes as given. We depart from this most traditional sort
of assumption in the case of the monopolist or the monopsonist-but even
the monopolist and the monopsonist operate in an economic environment
1 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
2 1 should note at some point, and this seems as good a point as any other, that I do
not contest the correctness of the Coase Theorem, or its analogue, in certain cases which
do not involve a genuine externality at all, such as the case of products liability, with
attention focused on accidents to users of the product. (Accidents to "innocent by-
standers" are a genuine externality.)
HeinOnline  -- 15 J.L. & Econ. 427 1972
THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
which responds in a particular known way to each possible choice of the
agent under consideration. The next step-to the consideration of oligopoly,
duopoly, bilateral monopoly, or whatever-takes us into the realm of strategic
behavior and the theory of games. My basic thesis in this essay is that the
Coase Theorem is a proposition in the theory of games, and not a proposition
about traditional markets or competitive equilibrium. My secondary thesis is
that the Coase Theorem even as a proposition in the theory of games is open
to doubt.
Instead of beginning with Coase's explicit argument for the Coase Theorem,
let us consider an argument which is implicit in Coase's original paper, but
which has been stated most clearly by Calabresi:
The interesting thing about this [Coase's] analysis, however, is that there is no
reason whatsoever to limit it to joint cost causers. Thus, if one assumes rationality,
no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of
resources would be fully cured in the market by bargains. Far from being surpris-
ing, this statement is tautological, at least if one accepts any of the various classic
definitions of misallocation. These ultimately come down to a statement akin to the
following: A misallocation exists when there is available a possible reallocation in
which all those who would lose from the reallocation could be fully compensated by
those who would gain, and, at the end of this compensation process, there would
still be some who would be better off than before.
This and other similar definitions of resource misallocation merely mean that
there is a misallocation when a situation can be improved by bargains. If people
are rational, bargains are costless, and there are no legal impediments to bargains,
transactions will ex hypothesis occur to the point where bargains can no longer
improve the situation; to the point, in short, of optimal resource allocation. We
can, therefore, state as an axiom the proposition that all externalities can be intern-
alized and all misallocations, even those created by legal structures can be remedied
by the market, except to the extent that transactions cost money or the structure
itself creates some impediments to bargaining.3
I call this the "a priori argument" for the Coase Theorem-"a priori"
because it reaches a conclusion about the result of individuals' economic be-
havior without any model of how individuals behave. What Calabresi is
saying may be rendered briefly as follows: If it cost nothing to get all the
individuals in an economy together and to get them to reach an agreement
about how the economy's resources should be employed, and if all these in-
3 Guido Calabresi, Transactions Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules-A.
Comment, 11 J. Law & Econ. 67, 68 (1968). [Footnotes in original omitted.]
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dividuals were rational, then necessarily, they would agree on a Pareto-ef-
ficient allocation. 4
Whether this statement is a tautology, as Calabresi says it is, depends on
the meanings of the terms used. While Calabresi is careful to tell us what
he means by "misallocation," he says nothing about what he means by "ra-
tional," a chameleon among words. In varying contexts the rational man
has been taken to be (inter alios): one who maximizes utility (or profit) in
the face of given prices and economic conditions; one who maximizes ex-
pected utility (or profit )in the face of risk; or one who adopts a maximin
strategy if he is playing a two-person constant-sum game. All of these are
standard meanings of "rational," but none of them suffices to make Cala-
bresi's statement a tautology, because the bargaining situation he envisages
is an n-person, variable-sum game, where n is likely to be very large indeed.
For participants in n-person, variable-sum games we do not, so far as I know,
have any real satisfactory concept of rational behavior. In particular, what
we do not have (which we do have in the simpler situations mentioned
above) is a model of behavior which seems to be "rational" both for the
individual and with regard to the overall outcome for the community.
To illustrate the problem: In a variable-sum game the players have some-
thing to gain from cooperation, but there are usually a variety of ways in
which the fruits of cooperation can be divided up. Each individual will wish
to see not only that the benefits of cooperation are achieved, but that he
gets as large a share of the benefits as possible. He will likely be led to threats
of non-cooperation as a device to increase his share. Clearly the threats will
be ineffective if they are not believed, and it is unlikely that threats will be
generally believed unless they are occasionally carried out. But whenever a
threat is carried out, the outcome of the game will be sub-optimal, in the
Pareto sense.5 In other words, what appears to be rational individual be-
havior will occasionally lead to an "irrational" overall outcome.
Two possible ways of avoiding the force of this suggestion come rapidly
to mind. One thing Calabresi might do is to define "transaction costs" to
4 As I observe in the text below, the a priori argument would not establish the in-
variance part of the Coase thesis even if it did establish the efficiency part. Calabresi
apparently regards it as establishing both parts because of an implicit assumption that
there is a unique efficient allocation.
5 Support for the suggestion that it is part of the nature of a threat that it results
in inefficiency if it is carried out may be found in Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of
Conflict (1960) and R. Nozick, Coercion, in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in
Honor of Ernest Nagel (Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton White, eds.,
1969). Note that what we are suggesting is that the carrying out of a threat results in
inefficiency as compared to the original set of possible outcomes. It does not necessarily
result in inefficiency within the set of outcomes available after the maker of a threat
becomes irreversibly committed to the behavior he has threatened.
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include the social cost of individual bargaining tactics. This would be a
clever move, but if we are correct in arguing that rational individual bar-
gaining may not always lead to socially optimal outcomes, then this defini-
tion would make the assumptions of zero transaction costs and individual
rationality inconsistent. Alternatively, Calabresi might define "rational" im-
plicitly by requiring it to mean whatever is necessary to make his claim
tautological. In other words, to say that individuals were rational would mean
precisely that in a costless negotiation situation, they would come out with a
Pareto-efficient agreement.6
This approach has considerable appeal. If we watched the parties to a
variable-sum game make threats and counter-threats and finally end up in an
inefficient situation, we might be tempted to think at least one of them must
have cut off his nose to spite his face. Of course, if we accept the conclusion
that rational individual bargaining tactics involve some unavoidable social
cost, this is not necessarily true. We might also reflect that this implicit
definition is too symmetrical. As far as the definition is concerned, both
parties must have cut off their noses to spite their faces. Each has con-
tributed to the failure to reach an optimum. But that impartial judgment
has not nearly the same intuitive appeal. Our intuitive reaction is that at
least one party must have behaved badly, but not necessarily both. This
suggests that we do have some notions of rational (or perhaps reasonable)
individual behavior in this kind of situation at an intuitive level. The prob-
lem is to formalize those notions and then consider whether rational indi-
vidual behavior does or does not guarantee collective rationality.7
6 This interpretation of Calabresi might even be suggested by his statement that the
efficiency part of the Coase Theorem can be treated as an "axiom." The word "axiom"
has at least two ordinary senses, however. In one sense, an axiom is merely an assumption
of a deductive system. In another sense, an axiom is an assumption which is supposed to
be self-evident. In the text we are considering the possibility of taking the efficiency
claim of the Coase Theorem as an axiom in the first sense, and we are arguing against
this on the ground that it is certainly not an axiom in the second sense-that is, it is not
self-evident. Calabresi, since he views the efficiency claim as tautological and understands
it, presumably does regard it as self-evident.
7 There is an assumption which might be useful in some contexts which is not unlike
the Calabresi axiom. It is the assumption that the expected magnitude of the inefficiency
which will remain after negotiation in any situation decreases as transaction costs de-
crease. We will not investigate the consequences of this assumption, but we note two
points. First, this assumption definitely does not entail the Calabresi axiom. It does not
entail that when transaction costs are zero, the expected magnitude of the inefficiency is
zero. Second, even this assumption is by no means self-evident. Transaction costs may be
such as to make communication not worthwhile or impossible. But to say communication
is not worthwhile is to say threats are not worthwhile. If this is true it may be easier for
the parties concerned to reach an efficient position which, for one reason or another, is
salient, than it would be if communication were possible and there was some prospect
of a threat's being effective. This argument closely parallels Schelling's observation that
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I do not mean to assert categorically that rational individuals faced with
zero transaction costs will fail to reach a Pareto-optimum, although I have
suggested what I consider a good reason for thinking this might often be
the case. What I do emphasize is that we have no basis for the claim that
a Pareto-optimum will be achieved, since we are offered no model of individ-
ual behavior. There are some bargaining models we might consider, such as
Harsanyi's,8 but to investigate them would take us considerably afield. I am
not aware of any bargaining model which has the features that have made
the competitive market model the main tool of price theorists and welfare
economists, namely that the existence and efficiency of equilibria can be de-
duced from assumptions about technology and individual behavior which
are fairly plausible on the whole.
So far we have discussed one highly abstract argument for the efficiency
thesis of the Coase Theorem. More specific arguments, including Coase's
original argument, generally purport to establish the efficiency claim and the
invariance claim together, and will be considered in a moment. Since I shall
attempt to show that every more specific argument somewhere includes an
implicit appeal to the a priori argument which we have just considered, it is
worth pausing to note the connection between the a priori argument and the
invariance thesis. More specifically, what we should note is that the a priori
argument lends no support whatever to the invariance claim. Even if the a
priori argument is accepted, it allows us to say only that in a world of zero
transaction costs and rational individuals, some efficient allocation of re-
sources will be achieved whatever the legal rules. Will the allocation be the
same, whatever the legal rules? This question we cannot answer, on the
basis of the a priori argument, since the a priori argument says nothing about
what efficient allocation will be achieved in any bargaining situation, and
since it gives us no explicit model of individual behavior from which we
might hope to find out. If we adopt the a priori argument for the Coase
Theorem, part of the Theorem becomes undecidable, since the allocation of
resources resulting from any given legal situation is incompletely specified.
Of course, if instead of the a priori argument we were operating with a
specific bargaining model, then we might decide the truth or falsity of the in-
variance claim. It could be suggested that in a plausible bargaining model
inability to send or receive communications may redound to the benefit of a party thus
incapacitated. Thomas C. Schelling, supra note 5, passim. The laws against extortion
might be interpreted as an effort selectively to increase transaction costs, in order to
promote efficiency.
8 John C. Harsanyi, A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations, 34
Econometrica 613 (1966). See also John C. Harsanyi, Bargaining and Conflict Situations
in the Light of a New Approach to Game Theory, 55 Am. Econ. Rev. No. 2, at 477
(Papers & Proceedings, 1965).
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the outcome of any negotiation ought to reflect to some extent our intuitive
evaluation of the strength of the parties' bargaining positions; and it could
also be suggested that legal rules are an important determinant of the strength
of the parties' bargaining positions; 9 in which case we would expect the in-
variance claim to be false. In other words, one of the criteria for the plausi-
bility of a bargaining model might be that it falsify the invariance thesis
(at least if the model is sufficiently sophisticated so that the invariance thesis
can be investigated). The main point, though, is that without a model, the
a priori argument tells us nothing about the invariance claim one way or
the other.
II
Now let us shift the focus of our attention to the invariance claim specifi-
cally, and let us begin with a simple and obvious argument against the in-
variance claim. We incorporate Coase's rancher-farmer example and discus-
sion by reference. Even if Coase's argument is good in the short run, and a
change of legal rule does not alter the efficient allocation of resources, there
will be changes in the long run. If the original legal rule specified that the
rancher was liable, and the new legal rule specifies that the farmer is liable,
then after the change of rule the rancher will not be paying some damages
he was paying before, and the farmer will be paying a bribe he was not
paying before. The rancher, then, will be earning a positive profit, and the
farmer a negative profit (since by assumption the original position was a
perfectly competitive equilibrium). The ordinary consequence of this profit
disequilibrium will be the allocation of new resources to ranching, and the exit
of resources from farming. In the long run, then, the allocation of resources
will change.
The argument I have just made is not novel. It was put forward by Cala-
bresi some years ago. 10 Unfortunately, Calabresi recanted in the later comment
on the Coase Theorem from which we have already quoted. His answer to his
own original argument was, essentially, that, given Coase's assumptions, "the
same type of transactions which cured the short run misallocation would also
occur to cure the long run ones."" This implicitly assumes that the long-run
changes brought about by the alteration of the legal rule are "misalloca-
tions," which require to be cured. But on the face of it we have no reason for
9 Specifically, we would expect the legal rules to influence the outcome of a bargaining
or arbitration session by influencing the "conflict point," the outcome which prevails if
no agreement is reached.
10 Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 730 n.28 (1965).
11 Guido Calabresi, supra note 3, at 67.
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thinking they are anything of the kind. It is well known that different effi-
cient competitive equilibria correspond to different distributions of wealth.
Even granting, then, that the allocation before the change of legal rule was
efficient, and that the allocation after the change must also be efficient, there
is no reason to assume they must be the same, if the change of legal rule
effected a redistribution of wealth, as there is every reason to suppose it did.
Perhaps it would be more enlightening to speak of "distribution of welfare"
than "distribution of wealth." If we do that, then it is plain that we should
expect a change in legal rule which shifts certain costs from ranchers to
farmers to redistribute welfare away from people who consume farm products
or supply factors to farms and in favor of people who consume ranch products
or supply factors to ranches. Of course, in the usual model of a competitive
economy, the "initial distribution of wealth" refers to the initial distribution
of stocks of goods, shares in the profits of firms, and ability to supply factors.
There is no reference to legal rules. But then, in the usual model of a com-
petitive economy, externalities are not admitted.
So far we have presented the straightforward argument against the invari-
ance claim, and we have pointed out the fallacy of Calabresi's answer to that
straightforward argument. A different answer to the straightforward argument
is suggested by Professor Nutter in a recent comment.12 Essentially, Nutter
argues that a change of legal rule will not cause a reallocation of resources,
but only a redistribution of rents. What Nutter offers by way of argument is
simply an arithmetical example, and his example does fall (or may be
interpreted to fall) into the one class of cases where his conclusion is plausible
-that is, where the change in legal rule might merely redistribute rents.
That is the class of cases where ranching and farming both use factors (in
this case land) which, when their activity is favored by the legal rule (tLat
is, when their activity is not liable) command rents at least equal to the total
damage caused by the externality. In such cases, the cost of damage may
come out of the rents earned by factors used in the activity held liable. But
this is hardly the general case. In the general case, there may be no factor
which is earning any rent at all in the favored activity. All factors may be
earning only their opportunity cost of employment in that activity. Plainly,
if no factor is earning any rent in the favored activity, then a change of legal
rule which makes that activity disfavored cannot merely redistribute rents.
At this point Nutter, or another defender of the invariance thesis, might
argue that the factors employed in the favored activity must be earning some
rent, on the ground that a situation in which the factors in the favored
12 G. Warren Nutter, The Coase Theorem on Sodal Cost: A Footnote, 11 J. Law &
Econ. 503 (1968).
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activity were earning zero rent could not persist. Suppose farming is the
favored activity. Now, if the factors employed in farming are earning zero
rent (the argument goes), then the rancher, instead of paying damages, will
bribe the factors currently employed in farming to go elsewhere, and will pay
out less in this process, since the total bribes need only exceed the total rents,
which, being zero, are less than the current damage payment. Therefore the
situation will not persist, and an equilibrium will be reached (or so the argu-
ment might continue) only when the total damage is less than the rents being
earned in the favored activity and the rancher has no further opportunity for
profitable bribes.
First, I should like to observe that this argument, like Coase's original
argument, depends explicitly on the possibility of bribes, and therefore
introduces non-market behavior. We are sliding back in the direction of the
a priori argument. Still, the appeal to non-market behavior may not seem
objectionable-the model may not seem implausible-in the context of a
fairly specific example such as this one. Let us then admit the possibility of
non-market behavior, and consider the next step.
The farmer, who suddenly finds that his units of factors have been bribed
out from under him by the clever rancher, is not going to sit still. His first
thought might be to hire other indistinguishable units of factors, but the
rancher will have forestalled that by bribing not merely the units which were
originally employed by the farmer but all units of those factors not to work
for the farmer. After all, when one can accomplish his purpose with an in-
finitesimal bribe, he can afford to bribe widely. The farmer's second thought
will be better. He will realize that the rancher has turned a tidy profit by
bribing his factors away instead of paying damages, and that he (the farmer)
can get a share by the simple expedient of threatening to go back into busi-
ness by offering higher bribes to the required units of factors. To be sure, if
he goes back into business on the same scale he will lose money. (Not much,
since a bribe which needs only to exceed an infinitesimal competing offer can
afford to be quite small. The farmer also has a natural advantage, in that
the rancher must bribe all units, while the farmer must bid only for an in-
significant fraction of all units.) But he will collect damages from the
rancher, and the rancher will lose more than he will. Plainly, therefore, the
rancher will see the light and turn over to the farmer some of his saving.
How much? Well, we can't say. As a matter of fact, the rancher is in a very
touchy position. Just as he had to bribe all the units of those factors which
the farmer employed (and not just the particular units originally employed
by the farmer), he will now notice that he is open to precisely the same threat
the farmer has just made from all potential farmers! We could pursue this
line of speculation, but the point is clear enough. The result is at best in-
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determinate, and it seems not unlikely the rancher will finally just stay at the
original equilibrium, paying out his damages to a farmer whose factors earn
zero rent.1 8
There is a final argument in favor of the Coase Theorem which has been
suggested by a number of writers. 14 The argument is essentially that in a
world of perfect information and zero transaction costs, there would not be
any external effects between or among firms for legal rules to deal with. If
there were two or more firms which were failing to internalize between them
an externality which connected their production functions (the argument
runs), then it would be profitable for these two firms to merge. The ex-
ternality would be internalized, efficient production would be achieved, and
the joint profit would be greater than the sum of the profits of the original
firms. The legal rule is left with nothing to operate on, unless it is supposed
to govern the distribution of rewards within the firm, which we assume it is
not.
The first thing to observe about this argument is that, like Coase's original
argument, it assumes successful bargaining and therefore assumes the truth of
the Coase Theorem, at least in a limited context. We are offered no explicit
model of the process by which appropriate firms are created. It is simply
asserted that in a world of perfect information and zero transaction costs, the
right organization of the economy into firms would appear. In other words,
it is asserted that a bargaining problem among indeterminate numbers of
potential entrepreneurs will be "solved" in an efficient fashion. This assertion
may seem fairly plausible if we concentrate on externalities which involve
only two or three firms before the merger movement, and if we concentrate
only on the two or three entrepreneurs associated with those firms. But we
have no license thus to limit our vision. For one thing, many external effects
operate among many firms. If we allow complete internalization by merger it
is likely that we will end up with non-competitive market structures in many
13 Actually, once we have opened up the possibility of bribes and threats, we observe
that the rancher may be susceptible to threats by potential farmers even when the original
farmer is in the market and collecting damages. As long as there is some land around the
rancher not being used for farming, any potential farmer is in a position to damage the
rancher by going into farming, and therefore in a position to attempt to extort from the
rancher a bribe for not going into business. This is true despite the fact that the
potential farmer, if he went into business, would lose money. The outcome is, of course,
indeterminate. This suggests that one reason we have legal rules against extortion and
"spite fences" and so on, is that in addition to being mean-spirited, such devices are
incompatible with the market system. Compare supra note 7.
14 For example, George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 113 (3rd ed. 1966); Otto A.
Davis & Andrew Whinston, Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games, 70 J. Pol.
Econ. 241 (1962); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ.
Rev. No. 2, at 347, 349 n.2 (Papers & Proceedings, 1967); G. Warren Nutter, supra note
12.
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industries. For that matter, if we allow internalization of "pecuniary" ex-
ternalities as well as technological ones-that is, if we allow firms to merge
for the purpose of becoming monopolies, as it will be in their interest to do--
then we should expect a non-competitive market structure in every industry.
Of course, we could appeal to the Coase Theorem again, and rely on bargains
to cure misallocations resulting from monopoly, but now we have lost the
defense of our original appeal to the Coase Theorem, which was that we were
assuming it only in a limited context, where it was plausible, to prove it
in a broader context. There is another difficulty with this appeal to the
Coase Theorem in a "narrow context." Even if we have an externality which
affects only a small number of actual firms before the merger movement, it
may affect many more potential firms. As we observed in connection with the
rancher-farmer case, it may not be enough for the rancher to buy off (or
merge with) an individual farmer. So long as farming is the favored ac-
tivity, it may be necessary to include every potential farmer in the deal,
since every potential farmer is in a position to inflict damage on the rancher
or on the merged rancher-farmer combination. To sum up, the appeal to
mergers or "appropriate" firms does not allow us to deduce the Coase
Theorem from traditional and plausible assumptions. We need to assume the
Coase Theorem in some contexts, and fairly broad contexts at that.
III
The upshot of all this is that Pigou was right after all, in a very important
way. Pigou at least recognized that if we wish to rely on the market to
produce an efficient result-that is, if we are going to attempt to deduce the
efficiency of the result from the traditional assumptions about individual
behavior-then some government intervention is required in order to equate
marginal private and marginal social cost. On the other hand, Pigou over-
looked, or at least did not draw attention to, a very important feature of the
problem, which Coase did draw attention to. That feature is that most exter-
nalities are, in Coase's words, "reciprocal." Which is to say, it is very likely
that the damage done is affected not by the decisions of one individual alone,
but by the decisions of many. The reciprocal nature of most externalities
means that Pigou considerably underestimated the difficulty of finding regula-
tory (tax-subsidy) schemes which would guarantee internalization. In the
rancherfarmer case, it will not do just to have the rancher pay damages to
the farmer, because then the farmer will have no incentive to take into
account the effect of his own decisions on the damage. In general to set up an
appropriate tax-subsidy scheme might require as much information on the
part of the regulating agency as would be required for centralized decision-
HeinOnline  -- 15 J.L. & Econ. 436 1972
PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST REVISITED
making. The market-mechanism-plus-regulation, then, is no certain high road
to efficiency. 15 As to invariance, if we do rely on the market-mechanism-plus-
regulation, and if we are fortunate enough to achieve an efficient equilibrium,
then there is every reason to believe that different regulatory schemes will
produce different efficient equilibria.
Finally, a word to the reader who wonders what difference it all makes.
After all, even those who assert the Coase Theorem as a deducible proposition
about competitive equilibria never seriously claim that the assumption of
zero transaction costs is realistic, so they always admit, as Coase himself
pointed out, that we need legal rules, and that what the rules are is important.
Aside from the simple matter of theoretical correctness, I think my conclu-
sions are important for two reasons. First, the assumption of zero transaction
costs, though it is unrealistic in general, might in certain cases, where the
externality is localized, be thought no more unrealistic than the other simpli-
fying assumptions economists work with regularly. In such cases, one who
believed the Coase Theorem might claim that having a legal rule really was a
matter of indifference, whereas if the Coase Theorem is false, or depends on
novel and dubious assumptions, this claim would be without foundation.
Second, and more important, once we realize that the legal rule affects (or, if
we rely on bargaining, presumably affects) the allocation of resources and
the distribution of welfare even granting Coase's assumptions, we will not be
tempted to speak as if the only function, or even the primary function, of
legal rules when there are transaction costs is to help us approach some
unique optimum which would exist if only transactions were costless. If there
are externalities, then there are decisions to be made about the distribution of
welfare even if we assume an "initial distribution of wealth" which is
specified in every other respect than the rules concerning externalities.
15 An illuminating foray into the difficulties of devising an appropriate tax-subsidy
scheme is provided by Otto A. Davis & Andrew Whinston, supra note 14.
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